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The Logical Problem of Evil and the Limited God Defense1 
By Darren Hibbs 
The philosophical problem of evil can be formulated in two ways.2  Each formulation 
presents an argument against the existence of God.  One version of the problem is the 
“Logical Problem of Evil” (LPE hereafter).  The LPE is a deductive argument.  A 
deductive argument is an attempt to prove that a conclusion is necessarily true, given 
the evidence.  The LPE can be expressed as follows: 
 
                        1.  If God exists, then evil would not occur. 
                        2.  Evil occurs. 
                        3. Therefore, God does not exist. 
The second version of the problem is the “Evidential Problem of Evil” (EPE 
hereafter).  The EPE is an inductive argument.  Inductive arguments attempt to prove 
that a conclusion is probably true, given the evidence.  The EPE can be expressed by 
modifying statements 1 and 3 of the LPE: 
 
                        1.  If God exists, then evil would probably not occur. 
                        2.  Evil occurs. 
                        3.  Therefore, God probably does not exist. 
The task for those who reject the LPE and the EPE arguments is to explain why these 
arguments fail.  My aim is to briefly discuss a response to the LPE called the “Limited 
God Defense” (LGD hereafter).  The LGD has not been a popular response to the 
LPE.  I will explain one objection to the LGD and then argue that the objection is not 
persuasive.  I will begin by elaborating some of the details of what I take to be the 
strongest version of the LPE. 
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Since the LPE is a deductive argument, it is an attempt to establish that it 
is impossible for its conclusion to be false, given the evidence offered in support of 
the conclusion.  The evaluation of a deductive argument is a two-step process.  The 
first step is to determine whether the argument is valid.  A deductive argument is valid 
if and only if it is impossible for the conclusion to be false, given the assumption that 
all the premises are true.  The premises of an argument comprise the evidence 
presented in support of the conclusion.  In the LPE above, the premises are 
propositions 1 and 2.  If we assume that both premises are true, then the conclusion 
must be true as well.  Validity is a property related to the form of an argument.  The 
form of the LPE argument above can be expressed by using symbols in place of the 
individual statements in the following manner: 
 
                        1. If X, then not-Y. 
                        2. Y. 
                        3. Therefore, not-X.3 
This argument relies on the claim that X and Y are logically incompatible.  If 
we assume that it is true that X and Y are logically incompatible, that means X and Y 
cannot be simultaneously true, although they may be simultaneously false.  Thus, if X 
is true, then Y must be false, and vice versa.  The second premise in the argument 
asserts that Y is true, therefore it follows that X must be false.4 
However, the fact that a deductive argument is valid does not guarantee that the 
argument is a comprehensive success.  The second step in the process of evaluation is 
to determine whether the argument is sound.  A valid deductive argument is sound if 
and only if all the premises are true.  The test for validity involves the assumption that 
all the premises are true.  Soundness requires that every premise be true not by 
assumption, but in fact.  The two premises are about “God” and “evil”.  In order to 
determine whether these premises are true, one would have to understand what is 
meant by those terms and what each statement is asserting about them.  The LPE 
argument relies on a particular notion of God that is grounded in western 
philosophical and theological traditions that I will call the “traditional” concept of 
God.5  According to the traditional notion, God is a personal deity that created the 
universe, governs the universe, and possesses the properties of omniscience, 
omnipotence, and moral perfection.  If God is omniscient, God knows the truth value 
of every proposition.  If God is omnipotent, God can do anything that is possible.  If 
God is morally perfect, God is morally infallible in terms of thought and 
action.6  Given this definition of God, the reasoning in support of premise 1 is as 
follows.  Since God is omniscient, God is aware of every occurrence of evil.  Since 
God is omnipotent, God could prevent any instance of evil.  Since God is morally 
2
Quadrivium: A Journal of Multidisciplinary Scholarship, Vol. 6 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/quadrivium/vol6/iss1/7
perfect, God would want to prevent evil.  Thus, if God exists, then evil would not 
occur. 
 The term “evil” is used in the present context to refer to suffering.  Suffering includes 
all the unpleasant experiences that sentient beings might endure, including physical 
pain and psychological pain.  Suffering can be brought about in different ways.  Some 
suffering is caused by human agency.  Murders, assaults, and other more trivial 
activities that human beings choose to engage in cause suffering.  Suffering that 
results from human agency is typically called “moral evil.”  Suffering is also caused 
by “natural” events.  The content and structure of the universe, along with the laws 
that govern it, produce diseases, famine, earthquakes, storms, floods, and other 
disasters that cause suffering.7  Suffering of this sort is typically called “natural evil.” 
The LPE may rely on the claim that the occurrence of suffering in general is 
incompatible with the existence of God or it may be modified to refer to some, but not 
all, suffering.  This is due to the possibility that some suffering may be deserved or 
that some cases of suffering are necessary to bring about something good that would 
otherwise not be realized.  For example, some suitable level of suffering might be 
morally permissible as a form of punishment for a person who violently attacks 
another person without justification.  In other cases it may be necessary to cause pain 
to bring about something good.  Some legitimate medical procedures cause pain, but 
the procedure may be required to produce something good that would otherwise not 
be realized (e.g. long term relief from a painful disorder).  Given these possibilities, 
God might be justified in allowing some suffering.8  Taking this into account, a 
modified LPE argument would target unnecessary, or gratuitous, suffering. 
 
                        1.  If God exists, then gratuitous suffering would not occur. 
                        2.  Gratuitous suffering occurs. 
                        3. Therefore, God does not exist. 
Suffering that is gratuitous or “pointless” is the sort of suffering that could have been 
prevented by God without thereby losing something good.  The modified version of 
the LPE has the same form as the original, so it is valid.  It is the strongest version of 
the LPE in my view since it selects the most puzzling occurrences of suffering (within 
a traditional theistic framework) as the basis for challenging theism.  The soundness 
of this version of the LPE will therefore depend on whether or not gratuitous suffering 
occurs and, if so, whether or not its occurrence is logically incompatible with the 
existence of God. 
 
LPE advocates offer alleged examples of gratuitous suffering to support premise 
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2.  The following is a candidate for gratuitous moral evil: 
A man kidnaps, brutally beats, rapes, and then strangles a five year old child to death. 
Here is a candidate for gratuitous suffering that is an instance of natural evil: 
In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire 
a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before 
death relieves its suffering.9 
LPE partisans argue that similar events occur frequently, and since an ordinary, decent 
human being would prevent them if they could, the fact that nothing prevents them 
entails that a morally perfect, all powerful deity doesn’t exist. 
Critics employ several strategies in response to the LPE that I will not explore.10  My 
aim is to discuss one aspect of a defensive strategy that avoids the logical problem by 
introducing the notion of a limited God. The LGD can be constructed in different 
ways.  The version I will focus on amounts to the view that God is neither omniscient 
nor omnipotent in the traditional sense of the terms.11  If this is the case, then it is 
obvious that the existence of such a being is at least logically compatible with the 
occurrence of gratuitous suffering.  For any given case of suffering, it is logically 
possible that a limited God may not know about it, since God is not omniscient.  For 
any given case of suffering, it is logically possible that God may not be able to 
prevent it, since God is not omnipotent.  If God is limited in these ways, premise 1 of 
the LPE is false and the argument is therefore unsound.  Although this seems like an 
obvious strategy to defuse the LPE, the LGD has not been a popular response.  Why? 
The prevailing view among philosophers who respond to the LPE challenge is to 
retain the traditional notion of a perfect God and explain how the existence of such a 
being is compatible with the suffering that occurs.12  The importance of retaining the 
notion of a perfect God is grounded in metaphysical and religious concerns.13  One 
metaphysical concern is related to the “Ontological Argument” for the existence of 
God.14  Arguments for the existence of God are usually divided into two categories: a 
posteriori and a priori arguments.  A posteriori arguments rely upon evidence derived 
from experience.  For example, the “Teleological Argument” appeals to the 
observation that nature seems to be similar to artifacts in the sense that both nature 
and artifacts appear to be “designed” for some purpose or end.  Since artifacts are 
products of intelligent design, then, by analogy, the universe is also the product of 
intelligent design.  A priori arguments rely solely upon an analysis of concepts rather 
than appealing to observable features of the universe.  The “Ontological Argument” is 
an example of an a priori argument for the existence of God.  Ontology is a branch of 
metaphysics that is concerned with fundamental questions about the nature of 
existence or being.  The Ontological Argument was first formulated by St. Anselm 
and has subsequently been restructured in numerous ways.15  The crucial claim in the 
Ontological Argument is that “existence” is an essential property of a perfect God’s 
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nature in the same way that omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection are 
essential parts of a perfect God’s nature.  A simple example of how a property can be 
essential to the nature of something is to consider the concept of a triangle.  The 
property “having three sides” is an essential part of what it means to be a 
triangle.  The Ontological Argument maintains that the property “existence” is to the 
nature of God as the property “having three sides” is to the nature of a triangle.   A 
simple version of the argument can be expressed as follows: 
 
            1.  By definition, God is a perfect being. 
            2.  A perfect being does not lack any perfection. 
            3.  Existence is a perfection. 
            4. Therefore, a perfect being (God) must exist by definition.           
The upshot is that a proper analysis of the concept of a perfect being reveals that such 
a being must possess the property of existence.  Proponents of the argument also 
claim that the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection are also 
necessary components of a perfect deity’s nature.16 
Divine perfection, traditionally understood, plays a central role in the version of the 
Ontological Argument above.  However, a version of the argument can be constructed 
that does not require an appeal to perfection, at least as perfection is understood in the 
traditional sense. The argument employs “modal” language.17   In the present context, 
modal claims are about the types of existence an entity can have.  The modal status of 
an entity might be “possible”, “impossible”, or “necessary.”  The meaning of these 
terms in modal discourse is often explained by appealing to the concept of a “possible 
world.”  The actual world is a possible world, but things could have been different (or 
so it seems).  For example, it is possible that the number of states that comprise the 
United States could currently be 49.  In modal discourse, this means there is a possible 
world (distinct from the actual world) where the number of states is 49.  Other 
possible worlds are more radically different than the actual world.  There are as many 
possible worlds as there are possible states of affairs that could constitute a 
world.  The concept of a possible world can be used to explain how “possible,” 
“impossible,” and “necessary” specify the modal status of different kinds of 
entities.  A possible being is one that exists in at least one possible world.  That is, it 
exists only in those worlds where the conditions necessary for its existence obtain. An 
entity such as a mountain is possible in this sense because it exists due to the presence 
of certain geological conditions.  Some possible worlds do not contain the conditions 
for the existence of mountains, so mountains and other “merely possible” entities do 
not exist in every possible world.  An impossible entity is one that does not exist in 
any possible world.  An entity is impossible if its properties are “logically 
incompatible.”  Properties are logically incompatible if they cannot coexist in the 
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same object.  An example of an impossible entity is that of a plane figure that is a 
“three-sided square.”  Three-sided squares cannot exist in any possible world because 
having three sides is incompatible with being square.  Finally, a necessary being is 
one that exists in every possible world.  That is, its existence is unconditional (unlike 
a mountain), it has no origin, and it cannot fail to exist.  This sounds reminiscent of 
the characterization of God in the original ontological argument above since it makes 
the same claim that existence is essential to the nature of this sort of being.  However, 
a modal version of the Ontological Argument can be formulated that makes no appeal 
to perfection as including omniscience and omnipotence.  A modal version of the 
argument is as follows: 
 
            1.  A being is possible if its concept is logically coherent. 
            2.  The concept of a necessary being is logically coherent. 
            3.  Hence, a necessary being is possible. 
            4.  If a necessary being is possible, then it necessarily exists. 
            5.  Therefore, a necessary being exists. 
The modal argument asserts that the concept of a necessary being isn’t incoherent in 
the way that a three-sided square is incoherent.  That is, there is no reason to think that 
an independent, eternally existing being is logically impossible based on an inspection 
of the concept of such a being.  Premise 4 asserts that if a necessary being is possible, 
then it must exist.  The assumption underlying this premise is that it is impossible for 
a necessary being to exist in some, but not all possible worlds.  If premise 3 is true, 
then a necessary being exists in at least one possible world.  But if an entity exists in 
some, but not all, possible worlds, it is not a necessary being by definition (i.e. it 
would be merely possible). Therefore, if a necessary being is logically coherent, it 
must exist in all possible worlds and that includes the actual world. 
Other than necessary existence, what sorts of properties could such a being 
possess?  Any properties that are logically compatible with necessary existence are 
candidates.  The selection of additional properties may be more or less defensible 
based on one’s theoretical goals or how plausible the existence of such a being is 
given how the world is, among other concerns.  For example, the proponents of the 
traditionalist notion of God would argue for including omniscience, omnipotence, and 
moral perfection to complete the concept of a necessary being.  However, the 
traditionalist account introduces the LPE as a challenge to the existence of such a 
being.  The LGD neutralizes the LPE if the necessary being is construed as a limited 
God that lacks omniscience and omnipotence.  For example, instead of omniscience, a 
limited God may know everything about the past and the present, but does not know 
the truth-value of all propositions about the future.  God may see the future as a set of 
possibilities with some states of affairs being more probable than others.  Regarding 
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omnipotence, God may be able to exert some measure of influence on all future 
events in the world, but may not be able to fully determine or control every aspect of 
the results.  This sort of being amounts to a limited God when compared to the 
traditional theist’s account where God is absolutely perfect with respect to knowledge 
and power.18  The basic point is that the concept of a limited God is consistent with 
the reasoning of the modal ontological argument and the existence of such a being is 
logically compatible with gratuitous suffering. 
For theists, the LPE presents a challenge because the argument is valid.  In order to 
defeat the argument, one would have to show that at least one of the premises is 
false.  Maintaining the notion of a maximally perfect being makes this challenge 
difficult.  The LGD is the most straightforward way of showing that the LPE is 
unsound, since the existence of a limited God is logically compatible with gratuitous 
suffering.  But many theists have been reluctant to employ this strategy.  One reason 
is that it would entail abandoning a traditional argument for the existence of God (the 
Ontological argument).  I have tried to show that embracing the concept of a limited 
God defuses the LPE but does not in-itself entail the abandonment of the ontological, 
or a priori, argumentative strategy for the existence of God. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. Throughout this paper, concepts, issues, and problems that are interesting and 
controversial in their own right will be mentioned that will not be discussed in any 
detail.  First rate summaries and bibliographical information about any aspect of this 
problem (and most other philosophical topics) can be accessed online for free via The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at the following address 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html> 
2. The problem of evil as I will discuss it is associated with philosophical debates 
generated within western monotheistic traditions. Some authors prefer to eliminate the 
use of the term evil.  Those who adopt this view call the problem under discussion 
“The Problem of Suffering”.  See Cole, Phillip, The Myth of Evil: Demonizing the 
Enemy. (Praeger, 2006). 
3. The symbols stand for statements in the original version:  “X” = “God exists”; “Y” 
= “evil occurs”. 
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4. Another way to understand the argument is in terms of necessary conditions.  “Not-
Y” being true is a necessary condition for “X” being true.  Since “Not-Y” is not the 
case (per premise 2), then “X” is false.  Compare with the reasoning in this 
example:  “X is a mammal” is a necessary condition for “X is a dog”; i.e. X cannot be 
dog if X is not a mammal. If the necessary condition is false (i.e. if X is not a 
mammal) then “X is a dog” is false also.  This argument form is called Modus 
Tollens.  It is a standard example of validity in classical sentential logic.  Like other 
traditional examples of valid argument forms, it has been challenged with 
counterexamples. For a counterexample to Modus Tollens, see Yalsin, Seth, Journal 
of Philosophical Logic, 41, (2012), pp.1001–102. 
5. An influential statement of this position is in Anselm, St., Proslogion, in St. 
Anselm's Proslogion, M. Charlesworth (ed.). (Oxford University Press, 1965). 
6. Some authors argue that this notion of God is incoherent.  See Morriston, Wes, 
“Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?”, Religious 
Studies, 37, (2001) pp. 143–160. 
7. Some diseases and some natural disasters are brought about as a result of human 
agency.  “Naturally caused” refers to those events that are not the result of human 
choice. 
8. Some philosophers in the Neoplatonic tradition hold evil to be non-existent, an 
illusion, or merely the absence or privation of the good.  I will not explore this branch 
of the debate either.  For a Neoplatonist account of evil as “not real”, see Plotinus, The 
Enneads, translated by Stephen Mackenna, (Penguin, 1991), pp. 56-70. 
9. An example discussed in Rowe, William L., “The Problem of Evil and Some 
Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, volume 16 (1979), p. 337. 
10. One popular strategy that is available to the theist is to argue that no occurrence of 
suffering that is a result of human agency is a case of gratuitous suffering.  This 
argument is called the argument from free will. There are numerous accounts of what 
“free will” means and how it is applied within the debate about evil.  For accounts of 
free will , see O'Connor, Timothy, "Free Will", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/>. For the “free will 
defense”, see Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/evil/>. 
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11. I leave out a deficiency in moral character since the debate about the relationship 
between omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection is complex.  It may or may 
not be the case that possessing the latter property is impossible without possessing the 
former two properties.  This is yet another issue that I will not discuss.  For opposing 
views see Swinburne, Richard,Providence and the Problem of Evil. (Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Martin, Michael, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, 
(Temple University Press, 1992). 
12. Influential works that defend this view include: Adams, Marilyn 
McCord, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, (Cornell University Press, 
1999); Hick, John, Evil and the God of Love, (Harper and Row, 1978); Plantinga, 
Alvin, God, Freedom, and Evil. (Harper and Row, 1974); Swinburne, Richard, The 
Existence of God, (Clarendon Press, 1979). 
13. There are many topics in each category that I will not discuss.  See Hill, David 
J., Divinity and Maximal Greatness, (Routledge, 2005). 
14. I do not intend to argue for the soundness of any version of the Ontological 
Argument – only that omniscience and omnipotence are not necessary components of 
such an argument. 
15. My discussion of the argument will remain at a very basic level.  For Anselm’s 
version, see note 5.  For subsequent formulations of the argument, see Oppy, Graham, 
"Ontological Arguments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ontological-arguments/>. 
16. For an overview of criticisms of the argument, see note 13. 
17. The proper analysis and usage of modal concepts is controversial.  My account is 
very basic and ignores technical issues.  For a detailed account of modal terminology, 
see Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), Conceivability and Possibility, (Clarendon 
Press, 2002). 
18. For a similar account of God’s properties, see Hartshorne, Charles, Omnipotence 
and Other Theological Mistakes, (SUNY Press, 1984). 
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